Thursday, February 23, 2012

Four Elements

Individual sports are defined and molded by the fundamental rules that govern the game. Basketball is a largely vertical and physical activity. Get tall, strong teammates. Likewise, volleyball players are generally vertically oriented (either by height or leaping ability). These are the outcomes of rules. If a volleyball court was enlarged 3 meters in every direction, then foot-speed would suddenly be an important factor. Consider how the 3-point line and the forward pass have formed the modern versions of basketball and football.

Ultimate is likewise shaped by rules. The dimensions of the field, the amount of contact allowed, and various smaller advantages given to the offense have created the style of play we know today.

I am sometimes shocked by how little most ultimate players think about the fundamental essence of the game. I play for an elite men’s club and, no doubt, compete with and against people who have not given 10 minutes of their lives to deeply, seriously analyzing the game. Pondering the horizontal offense or drawing Xs and Os does not count. I’m referring to something deeper. I hesitate to call them strategies because that almost sounds too specific.

In my estimation there are 4 important philosophies that are fundamental to ultimate. At first glance they are pretty simplistic. But, so are the principles that spawned the pick-and-roll, Wildcat, and triple threat.

These are neatly divided into O and D. I’ll attempt to flesh them out in subsequent posts. Briefly, they are:

Offensively
1. The Split.
2. Offense is easy.

Defensively
1. Shrink the field
2. Let the O turn it

1. The Split

Imagine we’re playing a chess game. I move my knight into a position where I can take two of your pieces. You have one move and must decide which piece is less valuable. You can’t save both. You’re split. The decision of which piece to give up is made easier in chess because pieces are often assigned a point value (Pawn: 1, Rook: 5, Queen: 9, etc).

Likewise, in ultimate, defenders cannot cover all positions and must give something up. I think of this as “The Split.” A common example of this is the vertical stack. It’s an offensive structure that puts defenders in The Split. They cannot take away all places on the field. Generally, they choose to stay on the live-side and give up the break-side. This bet is hedged by the marker, who is attempting to limit throws to the break-side.

An ultimate field is huge. Anyone who has gone 1v1 against a cutter or dump in open space knows how hard it is to cover all areas. It’s not a matter of being faster or in better shape. I have smoked much more athletic people and been beaten by geriatric masters players because of this fundamental principle.

So, design your offenses in ways that force defenders to make difficult decisions and exploit poor choices. Running harder, jumping higher and precision throws are not strategies that put your defenders into The Split. If you can design an offense that systematically encourages as many 1v1 matchups as possible, you’ll have the best chance of creating chances for defenders to chose poorly.

2. Easy-peasy

Offense is easier than most people realize.

Imagine this scenario: I put your O team on the line and offer $13,000 dollars* if you can advance the disc 70 yards against a comparable defense. What’s your strategy? Would you leave $13k to chance and throw up a jump-ball to your best receiver? Or, would you throw 15 high percentage passes until you scored?

Obviously you go for the most probable play, especially from the rationality of your armchair. But, most often this logic is not manifested in crucial games.

Few people would claim that jump-balls and fingertip layouts are the best method for scoring. But, players and fans love to see Beau sky a pile of defenders for the win.

The keys to a solid offense are intangible and few spectators will ever discern a wise decision that saves possession and wins the point. The human mind is very good at observing material events, but counterfactual thinking does not come naturally. It’s very difficult to recognize what DOESN’T happen: restraint—the tempting throw a player chooses not to take.



-------------------------------
*$13,000 dollars is not an entirely baseless figure. From my recollection, Club Nationals cost me about $500 (in 2006, on a college budget). From a team standpoint, Nationals has a value of at least $13k (500x~27). Thus, in the hypothetical Game-to-go, double-game-point, each team should be willing to pay $13k to win it. And, a poor throw could be that costly.








3. "Shrink" the field

Adding players to a limited space creates difficulties for the offense in at least three ways.
1. There is a greater chance that a defender might poach a D. In a wide-open field it’s easy for throwers to recognize possible threats. With limited space this becomes more difficult.

2. The advantage per throw is diminished. For instance, on a huge field an in-cut might gain 30 yards, while in a small space it only advances the disc 15 yards. Similarly, a swing in a large space gives the offense a totally new look and the defense must adjust significantly. On a mini field the defense can maintain their positioning with very little adjustment.

3. The possible aspects of attack are limited. Play mini for 2 games and I can guarantee you’ll see at least 1 huck go out the back of the endzone. The smaller field takes away the huck option. “Shrinking” the field limits those margins for error.

So, what good are these hypotheticals? We can’t physically shrink the field, but we can position ourselves in ways that effectively shrink the field. A mark is one attempt to halve the field. Adding more people to a limited space is another.

Recognize that not all offensive players are real threats at all times. If your opponent is 2 seconds, or 2 throws, away from a position of engagement, you should be 2 seconds, or two throws, away. This is the fundamental aspect of team defense. It increases efficacy because individuals can take risks (layout, force handlers downfield) with confidence that they will be covered if their player takes off.
You might say this defensive philosophy advocates lazy poaching. A contraire mon player. True team defense is much harder than simplistic man-to-man.

The phrase “in-your-face-lockdown-D” has an idealistic appeal to it. But, if you’re not taking anything away from a viable threat, then you’re not doing enough. How many times have you seen a defender resting with his cutter near away from the play? Once again, get into a position where you can disrupt the O.

Sunday, October 9, 2011

'round full circle (x3)














One decade of playing will take you a lot of places. The other day I tallied all of my ultimate tournaments. I may have forgotten a few. But, here’s the list:


2001

1. Pocatello Snack Master


2002

2. Pocatello
3. Santa Barbara Invite
4. PLU BBQ
5. Daze of Disc
6. Scorcher
7. Logan Fall Warmup
8. Big Sky Club Sectionals
9. NW Club Regionals


2003

10. Sundodger
11. PLU BBQ
12. Daweena
13. Pat’s Hat L.A.
14. Solstice
15. Kleinman
16. Scorcher
17. Big Sky Sectionals
18. NW Regionals


2004
19. New Years Fest (Tempe, AZ)
20. Pat’s Hat
21. Beaver Bowl
22. Gandy Goose
23. Daweena
24. Bozo Fest
25. Flowerbowl
26. Hot Apple Turnover
27. Potlatch
28. Kleinman
29. Solstice
30. Colorado Cup
31. Jackson
32. Chicago Heavyweight Championships
33. Scorcher
34. Logan
35. Big Sky Sectionals
36. Regionals


2005
37. Prez Day, San Diego
38. Stanford Invite
39. Centex
40. Oregon College Sectionals
41. NW College Regionals
42. Flowerbowl
43. Solstice
44. Potlatch
45. Kleinman
46. Discos Calientes
47. Scorcher
48. Oregon Club Sectionals
49. NW Club Regionals
50. CHUG
51. Hangover Hat, PLU
52. Sean Ryan, Santa Cruz
53. OFUDG


2006
54. College Vegas
55. Stanford Invite
56. Centex
57. Onionfest
58. Oregon College Sectionals
59. NW College Regionals
60. College Nationals, Columbus
61. Potlatch
62. Colorado Cup
63. Labor Day
64. Oregon Club Sectionals
65. NW Club Regionals
66. Chico
67. Club Nationals


2007
68. College Vegas
69. Stanford Invite
70. Centex
71. Oregon College Sectionals
72. NW College Regionals
73. College Nationals, Columbus
74. Potlatch
75. Boise Summer League
76. Kleinman
77. Scorcher
78. Big Sky Club Sectionals
79. NW Club Regionals
80. OFUDG


2008
81. Potlatch
82. Scorcher
83. Chico
84. Oregon Club Sectionals
85. NW Club Regionals
86. OFUDG


2009
87. Gandy Goose
88. Solstice
89. Cal States
90. ECC
91. New York Invite
92. Seaside
93. Labor Day
94. Oregon Club Sectionals
95. NW Club Regionals


2010
96. Gandy Goose
97. Flowerbowl
98. Solstice
99. Potlatch
100. Labor Day
101. Oregon Club Sectionals
102. NW Club Regionals


2011
103. Gandy Goose
104. Flowerbowl
105. Solstice
106. Potlatch
107. Labor Day
108. Oregon Club Secionals
109. NW Club Regionals




According to Google Maps, I’ve logged at least 86,480 miles, roundtrip. That’s 3 trips around Earth with a few thousand miles left over -- and all on domestic travel. Sheesh!









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Friday, September 28, 2007

Backhand vs Forehand

Why are elite teams still forced forehand?

SCOPE:
This argument is premised within the scope of several parameters.
First, this mostly just applies to elite throwers and teams. Midrange players are probably more dangerous being forced backhand because their forehands are so underdeveloped and unreliable. It's hard to say what the definition of "midrange" is. But, let's say above your local league juggernauts and below the lowest 25% of elite players.

Secondly, this mostly refers to throwers who are stationary. By that I mean, from stall 2-10. A team or player moving the disc before they have stopped running is a horse of a different color. A thrower can throw backhand on the run much faster, and more accurately, than throwing forehand on the run.

Thirdly, wind. Almost everyone has a better backhand than forehand in strong (read Sarasota) wind. Additionally, forehands are much more accurate downwind because they allow for more touch and finesse.


Let’s break it down…


ACCURACY:
Years ago my friend Stockett bet me $5 that my forehand was more accurate than my backhand. I accepted with several reasons in mind. First, every human being in the world can throw a decent backhand by the time they are six years old. It’s the first thing you do with a disc and so natural (it's an everyday grip -- picture the way you grab a bar or door handle). Conventional wisdom says it’s more accurate. Secondly, like most new players, the backhand had developed much faster and easier than my flick. Thirdly, Stockett is a real jabroni (this is a thesis I’ve been testing over the years). So, we threw alternating forehands and backhands taking one step backwards after each throw. As long as the receiver didn't have to move more than one pivot length to catch the throw counted as being accurate. At about 35 yards we each had our first screwup. To my surprise it was our backhands that betrayed us. Looks like Stockett had some knowledge I didn’t.

I have done this exercise several times since then (although not recently) and have had pretty similar results. It would be useful to get a whole team to do it as a warm-up before practice (to enlarge the sample size).

Of course, game throws are different than tossing- around-in-the-park throws, blah, blah. But, the accuracy ratios are probably the same.


STANCE:
The backhand stance limits periphery. To get separation from the mark, the thrower must turn his hips and shoulders in the wrong direction! This is especially true for I/O breakmarks. A lot of throws are put blindly. We've all seen an instance of someone ripping a monster backhand huck just as their cutter has put on the brakes to come under. The disc sails to nobody and the sideline says, "Good rip. Unlucky."

Here’s another simple exercise: Stand facing a wall and get in a backhand throwing stance. How far down the wall can your see (on the breakmark side)? Try it again but extend out to your release point. Farther. Now do it forehand style.


TIME:
Takes longer to throw a backhand.
The offensive implications of this are that you might miss a throwing window. That is to say, in the short time a cutter is actually open, a thrower might not be able to wind up and throw. This problem is amplified for long breakmark throws (+30 yards), because
a. Significant windup is necessary
b. A thrower typically has to use one or two fakes to either move or paralyze the marker.
Yes, a thrower must use fakes to make forehand breaks. But, not as many because they can get throw off faster. A move to set up an I/O backhand break usually requires a big pivot and forehand fake. But, an I/O flick usually requires no more than a shoulder shimmy.

The implications for the Defense can be subdivided into Marking and Downfield.
On the mark, a team can enjoy an extra split second. Defensive markers are able to anticipate a backhand throw much earlier than a forehand. Seth showed me this the first year I played with him. Some very good throwers can put a flick 70 yards with a quick whip of their elbow and wrist. Even midrange elite players can do this. How many can put a backhand 70 yards without a windup?

Downfield a backhand force means that a defender can bite a little harder on fakes and not get burned as much, assuming there are more times, and positions, in a backhand throwing motion where the thrower loses visual contact with downfield areas. In a vertical stack defenders can poach (especially to the break side).



RANGE:
An I/O backhand breakmark has a shorter range than an I/O flick. A lot of readers out there are thinking, “this guy is full of shit. I can throw my I/O backhand much farther than my I/O forehand.” Well, “maybe” is all I can reply.


EXCEPTIONS:

1. The “Lugsdin” player. There are some players who, for whatever reason, have deadly backhands and relatively limited flicks.

2. Stiff wind. Against a strong wind (like Sarasota) backhands are more stable and accurate. So, force flick upwind and backhand downwind.

3. Give-and-go offenses. (again, see the “SCOPE” section)



THEREFORE:

Why would anyone force an elite team forehand rather than backhand?


PS.

I am sure that Jim P, in his quest to count everything, has statistics for turnovers in the following categories:
Forehand turnovers to the open side
Forehand turnovers to the break side
Backhand turnovers to the open side
Backhand turnovers to the break side

I would love to see them. If anyone is keeping stats this weekend (at Regionals) give it a whirl.





Compare the hips and field of vision in these photos